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LET’S MAKE A DEAL (OR NOT): DOES THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY’S APPROPRIATIONS POWER LIMIT THE 
GOVERNOR’S ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
By, Stephen A. Yokich 
Stephen A. Yokich is a partner in the union-side labor law firm of Cornfield and Feldman in Chicago, 
Illinois.  He also holds a part-time position as Associate General Counsel for the International Union, 
UAW.   He has held these two positions since 2001. He represents unions and employees in labor and 
employment matters in arbitration, state and federal administrative agencies and in state and federal 
trial and appeals courts. 
Yokich graduated from Northwestern University in 1978 and from the University of Michigan Law 
School in 1981.  He clerked for the Honorable George Clifton Edwards, the Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1981-82.  In 1993-94, he was General Counsel for Labor 
for the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and Labor. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ridicule of the wages, hours and conditions of public employees in the State of 
Illinois has become a staple of what passes for serious commentary on the fiscal 
condition of the State.[1] Such ill-informed commentary has been used to attack 
the very notion of collective bargaining for public employees, despite the common 
sense observation that public employees have the same skills, the same needs and 
seek the same advantages as their counterparts in the private sector.[2] A more 
honest evaluation of  public sector collective bargaining would do well to 
remember the long struggle of public workers and their unions to obtain the same 
democratic rights at their workplaces as their counterparts in the private sector. 
One aspect of this movement is well illustrated by the sanitation workers who 
struck the City of Memphis in February 1968.  They  had simple goals.  They 
wanted wages that would lift them out of poverty.  They sought safer working 
conditions.  They hoped to end racial discrimination in their workplace.  They 
sought to affirm their right to individual dignity with the simple slogan “I Am a 
Man.”  And, they wanted respect for their collective dignity through recognition of 
their union. 
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The strike was a last resort.  No legal framework existed which compelled the City 
of Memphis to meet with or bargain with the local union.  And no other framework 
existed for the parties to meet to discuss the issues which caused the strike or for a 
resolution to occur without resort to “economic warfare.” It took the assassination 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to bring the parties to the bargaining table to resolve 
some of the issues that led to the strike.[3] In the ensuing 45 years, public sector 
collective bargaining  has addressed the issues that caused the strike in Memphis 
and has helped black and female workers achieve stable and secure 
employment.[4] 
In Illinois, public employment was characterized by patronage, the most famous 
example being the political machine operated by Richard J. Daley.  The patronage 
guaranteed public employment so long as the employee faithfully supported the 
appropriate political party.  Party leaders made the decisions regarding political 
and legislative questions and employees were expected to support these 
leaders.  Public employee unions led the challenge to patronage in Illinois state 
government, arguing that this system violated the First Amendment rights of 
public employees.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in Illinois State 
Employees Union, Council 34, AFSCME v. Lewis,[5] and other courts eventually 
followed.[6] The demise of the patronage system opened the way for collective 
bargaining; a system in which public employees themselves decide what their 
interests are and the best way to achieve them. 
Thus, in 1983, a Democratic General Assembly and a Republican Governor, James 
Thompson, enacted the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Act.  Together these statutes provided a 
“‘comprehensive regulatory scheme for public sector bargaining in Illinois.’”[7] As 
set forth in Section 2 of the IPLRA, the purpose of the statute was to grant public 
employees full freedom to form and join unions and to collectively bargain with 
their employers, to protect the public health and safety from the disruptions caused 
by labor disputes and to provide peaceful and orderly procedures to prevent labor 
strife.[8] The statute thus provided public employees with the right to seek to 
improve their working conditions and to control their own destinies in the 
workplace. 
The Illinois Supreme Court will soon hear an appeal in a case which implicates 
some of the fundamental principles involved in the collective bargaining 
process.[9] The case is an appeal from  an arbitrator’s award requiring the State of 
Illinois to pay the wages required by a collective bargaining agreement.  The State 
refused to honor the award claiming that it had “insufficient funds” to do so.  It 
contends that collective bargaining agreements with the State are not enforceable 
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until legislative appropriations to fund those agreements have been enacted.  In 
support of this argument, the State invokes the “power of the purse” held by the 
Illinois General Assembly. The Appellate Court rejected this argument, but the 
Illinois Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal.  Acceptance of the principles 
advanced by the State would seriously undermine the statutory policies of the 
State’s labor relations acts and erode the hard-won progress public employees have 
made in their fight to democratize their workplaces.  This article explains why. 
II.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The following facts are set forth in the Appellate Court opinion and in the 
stipulations of the parties.[10] 
A.  The Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Cost Savings 
Agreements 
In 2008 the State and AFSCME negotiated a four year collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”).  The agreement provided a series of wage increases at periodic 
intervals during its term, with the last two scheduled for July 1, 2011 and for 
January 1, 2012. 
In the summer of 2009, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn directed 10 state agencies to 
lay off 2,500 employees with the layoffs scheduled to take place early in the 2010 
fiscal year.  AFSCME filed a grievance over the layoffs, and it reached a mediated 
resolution with the State in January 2010.  Pursuant to the mediated resolution, 
the State reduced the number of layoffs to 1,200, closed 4 state run facilities and 
deferred some of the wage increases set forth in the contract.  The mediated 
resolution contained a number of other measures designed to reduce the State’s 
personnel expenditures.  These measures saved the State more than $300 million, 
which far exceeded the amount the State would have saved under its original layoff 
plan. 
In 2010, Governor Quinn sought further savings from the union.  The parties 
signed cost savings agreements (CSAs) in the fall of 2010.  The first agreement set 
a goal of finding an additional $100 million in budgetary savings and named 
arbitrator Ed Benn to resolve any disputes arising under the CBA and CSA. By early 
November, the parties had identified sufficient savings.  The parties then entered 
into the second CSA.  The second CSA provided that there would be no layoffs or 
facility closures prior to the end of the CBA, e.g. July 1, 2012.  The savings 
encompassed by the CSAs included savings from the deferral of raises, use of 
unpaid furlough days, reduction of overtime and other measures.  The parties 
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agreed to $27.6 million in savings due to the deferral of ½ of the 4 percent raise 
scheduled for July 1, 2011 to February 1, 2012. 
B.  The Evolving Budget for the 2012 Fiscal Year 
  The Budgetary Dance: Act I 
In February 2011, the Governor submitted his proposed budget to the General 
Assembly for Fiscal Year 2012.  Fiscal Year 2012 covered the period from July 1, 
2011 to June 30, 2012.  The budget proposed personal services appropriations in 
agencies covered by the CBA large enough to maintain the same headcount in each 
agency (to fullfill the no layoff/ no closing agreement) and to fund the raises as 
scheduled in the CSAs.  In May 2011, the General Assembly approved 
appropriations bills for all state agencies.  After the appropriations bills were 
approved, the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget (GOMB) analyzed the 
personal services appropriations in the bills and concluded that the appropriations 
for 14 agencies were insufficient to honor both the no layoff/no closing agreement 
and the schedule of deferred wage increases for the entire 2012 Fiscal Year.  The 
GOMB concluded that in 12 of the 14 agencies, the funds were insufficient to 
operate the agency for the entire fiscal year, even without the payment of the wage 
increases.[11] 
On June 30, 2011, the Governor acted on the appropriation bills that had been 
passed by the General Assembly.  He signed them.  In addition, he used his 
amendatory veto power and his line item veto authority to remove $376 million 
from the budget enacted by the General Assembly. 
 The Pay Freeze and the Arbitration 
Consequently, on July 1, 2011, the Illinois Department of Central Management 
Services (“CMS”) issued a memorandum freezing the pay of the employees in 14 
state agencies for the 2012 Fiscal Year.  This meant that while the employees in 39 
agencies subject to the Governor received wage increases, the employees in 14 
agencies did not.  Approximately 30,00 employees worked in these agencies, 
which included some of the largest in State government, such as the Illinois 
Department of Corrections (IDOC), the Department of Human Services (DHS) and 
the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR).  The State estimated that it would save 
approximately $76 million from the implementation of this freeze. 
When the State refused to pay the wage increases required by the CBA and the 
CSAs, the union began proceedings before Arbitrator Benn.  Arguing that a “deal 
is a deal,” the union maintained that the arbitrator should enforce the agreements 
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as written because they contained no contingencies based upon the level of 
budgetary appropriations. 
In response, the State made three basic arguments: (1) that its duty to perform the 
contracts and to pay the raises did not arise until the appropriation of sufficient 
funds to do so; (2) that Section 21 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations 
Act,[12] made the enforceability of the “out-years” of a multi-year collective 
bargaining agreement dependent upon budgetary appropriations and (3) that 
enforcing the contract would undermine the authority of the General Assembly 
under the Illinois Constitution to set the level and direction of State spending. 
On July 19, 2011, the arbitrator issued his decision.  He rejected the State’s 
arguments and ordered the State to pay the increases scheduled for July 1, 2011, 
within 30 days. 
In his decision, Benn found that the CBA and the CSAs “leave nothing to the 
imagination” and that the “clear and simple terms” of the agreements required 
payment of the wage increases pursuant to the schedule negotiated by the parties. 
He held that any other conclusion would require him to violate the contractual 
provision that the arbitrator had no power to amend the contract or to subtract 
from or nullify the provisions of the CBA or CSA’s.[13] Responding to the State’s 
contention that the obligation to pay the wage increase was contingent on 
appropriations, the arbitrator noted: “when parties to collective bargaining 
agreements agree that wage increases are contingent upon the existence of 
sufficient appropriations, they say so. There is no language here to that 
effect.”[14] The arbitrator refused, however, to interpret the State’s statutory and 
constitutional arguments because he believed that such statutory interpretations 
were to be made by the courts and not by an arbitrator.[15] 
The arbitrator did analyze the State’s contention that the contract expressly 
provided that it could not “supercede law.”[16] He held that this general provision 
could not override the very specific provision of the contract which denied the 
arbitrator authority to nullify any provision of the contract. Likewise, he held that 
Article II of the Agreement, which preserved the statutory obligations of the State, 
did not require a different result, because the language in question also prohibited 
State action which violated the obligations of the Agreement.[17] 
The arbitrator then commented on the State’s argument that honoring the 
collective bargaining agreement was contingent on “sufficient” legislative 
appropriations: 
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As discussed in the award, under the Agreement and the Cost Savings Agreements and as a matter 
of contract, the State’s position that it is not obligated to pay the reduced negotiated increase is 
clearly incorrect. . . . 
Because I am an arbitrator functioning solely under the terms of the Agreement and the Cost 
Savings Agreement, I have not considered the States’ statutory or Constitutional 
arguments.  However, if the State is correct in its statutory or Constitutional arguments that 
although it has negotiated multi-year collective bargaining agreements with the Union since 1975 
(and I note has also long negotiated multi-year collective bargaining agreements with other 
unions), it does not now have to pay negotiated and agreed-on wage increases in those multi-year 
collective bargaining agreements because wage increases agreed to by the State in those 
agreements are in effect unenforceable or are contingent on sufficient appropriations from the 
General Assembly and that such positions find support in Section 21 of the IPLRA and the 
Constitution, then a major foundation of the collective bargaining process – the multi-year 
collective bargaining agreement – has been upended.[18] 
Upon receipt of the decision, the State filed suit to vacate the award and to obtain a stay of its 
effect.[19] The court granted the stay on July 22, 2011. 
  The Budgetary Dance: Act II 
As noted above, the appropriations for 12 of 14 agencies in question were 
insufficient to even operate the agencies for the entire fiscal year without 
reductions in force.  A new act of the budgetary dance began on September 8, 2011, 
when the Governor announced the closing of seven State facilities operated by the 
Departments of Corrections and Human Services.  He also announced the layoff of 
more than 1,900 State employees.  The Governor announced that these measures 
would save approximately $55 million in the 2012 Fiscal Year. In connection with 
this announcement, the Governor stated that the General Assembly could avert the 
closings and layoffs by upholding his June 2011 line item vetoes of $376 million 
and approving supplemental appropriations to fund the facilities and positions of 
the employees slated to be laid off. 
That day, the State filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking a 
declaration that the closures and the layoffs did not violate the contract, that they 
were otherwise legal and that it had no obligation to arbitrate its decision to 
implement the layoffs and the closures.[20] This case was consolidated with the 
earlier one. 
As in the earlier case, AFSCME contested the proposed layoffs and facility closings, 
arguing that these proposals violated the provision of the Cost Savings Agreements 
which promised that there would be no facility closings or layoffs through June 30, 
2012.  This issue  was also submitted to Arbitrator Benn.  Arbitrator Benn issued a 
SPRING 2015 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 9 
 
second award on October 3, 2011, finding these measures to be in violation of the 
“clear language” of the Cost Savings Agreements as well.[21] 
One of the main arguments made by the State to the Arbitrator was that it could 
not afford  to meet its contractual obligations because the General Assembly did 
not appropriate sufficient funds to fulfill the Governor’s requests and to meet the 
State’s contractual obligations.  In response to this argument, the arbitrator 
observed: 
There are no pre-conditions in the Cost Savings Agreements (or any agreements relevant to this 
case) that make the State’s commitments contingent upon the subsequent passing of budgets 
sufficient to fund the State’s obligations under those agreements. If the parties intended that result, 
they would have said so in the Cost Savings Agreements.  Where contractual commitments by 
public employers are meant to be contingent upon the passing of a budget sufficient to fund a 
collective bargaining agreement, the parties memorialize that commitment in their contracts.[22] 
The arbitrator then listed multiple examples of labor contracts between the State 
and unions that did just that and concluded that there were “no similar provisions 
in any of the agreements involved in this case which make an economic contract 
commitment by the State in any way contingent on the passing of a budget by the 
General Assembly sufficient to pay for those economic commitments.” [23] 
As in the first case, the State sought to vacate the arbitrator’s award and to stay its 
effect.   After briefing and argument,  Judge Billik denied the Motion on October 
31, 2011.  Judge Billik noted that granting the stay would allow the State to receive 
the benefit of the relief it was ultimately seeking, despite the very clear language of 
the Cost Saving Agreement and the holding of the arbitrator.  He concluded that 
the State had “not specifically shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits” or that,” the balance of equities supports the issuance of the stay being 
requested.”[24] The parties then briefed and argued the petition to vacate the 
second award on the merits and Judge Billik set a ruling date of December 2, 2011. 
While the litigation proceeded, the General Assembly considered a supplemental 
appropriations bill during its Fall “veto session.”  On November 29, 2011 the 
General Assembly passed a supplemental appropriations bill.[25] The personal 
services appropriations in this bill were sufficient to prevent both the scheduled 
layoffs and the scheduled facility closures for the duration the 2012 Fiscal Year. 
The final legislation passed by the General Assembly had several elements.  In total 
the bill contained almost $475 million in appropriations for personal services, 
other agency operations and capital projects. This included $165.5 million in 
appropriations to the 14 agencies subject to the pay freeze.  Nine agencies received 
additional personal service appropriations. Simultaneously, the General Assembly 
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enacted two pieces of legislation which reduced state taxes.  Public Act 97-636 
created or extended ten state tax incentives. The General Assembly’s legislative 
findings for these tax reductions included the statement that a tax incentive 
package that does not exceed $250 million can be approved without negative 
impact to the State budget in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 
The General Assembly also enacted Senate Bill 400 which increased the Earned 
Income tax Credit for working families and increased the personal exemption for 
all Illinois taxpayers by $50 per year.  Governor Quinn signed this bill on January 
10, 2012.  At the time he signed the bill, Governor Quinn stated that “we can’t forget 
the everyday people who are the heart and soul of Illinois.”  Quinn also stated that 
“one of the best ways to stimulate the local economy is to put more money into the 
pockets of working families.”  In discussing the cost of the legislation, Governor 
Quinn stated, “we can certainly afford this.”[26] 
The General Assembly enacted one additional supplemental appropriation bill for 
the 2012 Fiscal Year. In the Spring, it was reported in the news that state funding 
for certain day care providers was exhausted, which meant that the program would 
cease functioning prior to the end of the 2012 Fiscal Year.  Soon thereafter, the 
General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed Senate Bill 2450 which 
transferred approximately $75 million dollars from an appropriation line in the 
Department of Health Care and Family Services to the Department of Human 
Services for use in the day care program.[27] 
III.   ANALYSIS OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENTS TO VACATE THE 
ARBITRATOR’S AWARD 
As the Appellate Court stated in its opinion, that State’s position in this case is that 
it had no legal obligation to perform the duties contained in the CBA and CSA until 
the appropriation of “sufficient funds” to do so by the General Assembly. Whether 
phrased as a matter of contract law, as a matter of statutory construction or as a 
state constitutional principle, this argument should be rejected. 
First, as a matter of contract law, the principle urged by the State in this case has 
no support in either Illinois case law or statute.  Generally, a party must abide by 
its contractual responsibilities, even when a subsequent contingency renders 
performance of the contract impossible.  This means that when a party takes on an 
unqualified commitment, it may not later claim that there were implied conditions 
to that commitment if those conditions could have been anticipated or guarded 
against in the contract.[28] Since the State could have reasonably foreseen either 
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an appropriations or a revenue shortfall, it should not be able to claim that it was 
impossible for it to perform the contract.[29] 
The IPLRA explicitly anticipates that employers may enter into binding contracts 
prior to the appropriations process.  Section 7 of the Act defines the process of good 
faith bargaining as the obligation to meet in good faith prior to the employer’s 
budgetary process and to make agreements based upon those meetings.[30]  This 
means that the agents of the parties who bargain must have the authority to make 
binding agreements.  In Illinois, the Director of CMS bargains on behalf of the 
Governor and Executive Branch.  For bargaining to be meaningful, the Director 
must have the statutory authority to make contracts that can be 
enforced.  Otherwise, the State would always be able to get a  “second bite at the 
apple” once negotiations were concluded and the wages and benefits of public 
employees would be a “political football” in the legislative process.  This would 
negate the statutory policy of the IPLRA. 
A corollary to this principle is that agents with apparent authority have the power 
to bind the entities they represent.  Under similar provisions in the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Act, the courts have held that a “a designated agent 
taking part in CBA negotiations is deemed to have apparent authority to bind the 
principal absent affirmative, clear and timely notice to the contrary.”[31] The 
courts also recognize that collective bargaining grievance settlements made by 
agents of employers are binding unless there is an explicit reservation of authority 
by the agent.[32] In the same vein, settlements negotiated to settle unfair labor 
practices by agents with apparent authority are biding even when they require the 
expenditure of public funds.[33] 
These rules have special force when the union and its members perform the 
contract and the public employer accepts the benefits of that 
performance.  Acceptance of the benefits from a labor contract by a public 
employer constitutes ratification of the binding force of that agreement.[34] 
These precepts apply well in this case. In consecutive fiscal years, the union met 
with the State to bargain cost cutting measures designed to alleviate shortfalls in 
State revenue.  The State never conditioned its agreements based upon budgetary 
appropriations.  And, the State accepted the benefits of the cost saving measures 
the union agreed to.  There is no principled reason why the State should be able to 
walk away from its bargain after its employees and their union have performed 
theirs. 
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Public employers may make their performance of a contract contingent upon 
future events by negotiating appropriate contract language.  As the arbitrator 
noted in this case, however, the parties did not do that.  Accordingly, his decision 
to compel the State to honor the clear terms of the contract was based upon well 
accepted principles of contract and labor relations law. 
Second, as a matter of statutory construction, the provisions of the IPLRA leave no 
room for a different result.  As noted above, the statute explicitly contemplates that 
bargaining will precede the budgetary process.  The statute requires a public 
employer to reduce to writing and to execute the agreements made in collective 
bargaining.[35] The statute contains no implied contingencies that contradict 
these explicit requirements. 
Meaningful collective bargaining can only occur with a decision-maker who has 
the power to make binding commitments.  Bargainers must have either the explicit 
or implied authority to conclude agreements.  If any deal can be easily unraveled, 
bargaining will be prolonged and labor relations issues will fester, leading to 
economic strife and the disruption of public services.  These factors led the drafters 
of the IPLRA to define the policy of the State as one that gives public employees 
the “full freedom” to engage in concerted activities, to join and form unions and to 
collectively bargain with their public employers.[36] 
The State has relied heavily on Section 21 of the IPLRA.  Section 21 states that 
“subject to the appropriation power of the employer, employers and exclusive 
representatives may negotiate multi-year collective bargaining agreements 
pursuant to the provisions of this Act.”[37] The Appellate Court held that this 
statutory provision did not apply because the General Assembly was not an 
“employer” under the IPLRA.  This conclusion is unquestionably correct because 
the IPLRA specifically excludes the General Assembly from the definition of 
“employer.”[38] Instead, the courts construe a statute as a whole to determine 
legislative intent.[39] 
This Appellate Court’s conclusion is also strongly supported by the legislative 
history of the IPLRA. The Illinois Senate rejected a formal legislative oversight of 
State employee collective bargaining when it defeated an amendment requiring 
legislative approval of collective bargaining agreements during the debate on 
Senate Bill 536.[40] This legislative history is persuasive evidence that the General 
Assembly did not contemplate that it would retain some sort of veto power over 
the actions of the Executive Branch in collective bargaining. The courts have relied 
on similar legislative history to clarify ambiguities in other portions of the 
IPLRA.[41] 
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At the time the IPLRA was enacted, the State and public employee unions had 
already bargained a series of multi-year contracts pursuant to Governor Walker’s 
Executive Order No. 6.  While the initial collective bargaining agreements 
contained provisions with contingencies based upon appropriations, the later 
agreements did not.  Thus, the State and the public employee unions representing 
State employees had accepted the principle that the Executive Branch had the 
authority to make binding contracts well before the enactment of the statute. 
Section 21 was added to the IPLRA as part of a manager’s amendment when Senate 
Bill 536  was considered by the House in June 1983.  There is no legislative history 
regarding the reason for its addition.  Thus, there is no support for the argument 
that Section 21 was added to the IPLRA to reduce the right of State employees and 
their unions to make enforceable collective bargaining agreements. 
There is a better explanation for both the language of Section 21 and the timing of 
its insertion into the IPLRA.  That explanation lies in a piece of litigation that arose 
in early 1983 and which posed the issue of whether a unit of local government had 
the power to agree to a a schedule of wage increases that covered more than a single 
fiscal year.  In Ligenza v. Village of Round Lake Beach, the Appellate Court held 
that a Village had no obligation to pay the wage increases set forth in a labor 
agreement because the agreement contract was negotiated prior to an 
appropriation to support the contract by the Village Council.[42] The Court held 
that this procedure conflicted with Section 8-1-7 of the Municipal Code.[43] 
Significantly, the dispute in Ligenza arose in May 1983, as the General Assembly 
was considering Senate Bill 536.  The trial court litigation in Ligenza was in “full 
swing” by that date, which makes it very likely that Section 21 was added to the 
IPLRA in response to the claim of the Village in that litigation.  This narrative 
explains both the timing and the language of the amendment.  This means that the 
purpose of Section 21 was to protect the rights of municipal employees, not to 
shrink the rights of State employees.[44] 
Accordingly, the State’s defense to its breach of contract must rise or fall based 
upon its argument that the Illinois Constitution gives the General Assembly the 
exclusive right to set the level and direction of public spending.  Section 2(b) of the 
Finance Article of the Constitution states that the “General Assembly by law shall 
make appropriations for expenditures of all public funds by the State.”[45] From 
this constitutional language, the State contends that “all” State money must be 
expended pursuant to an appropriation and that appropriations did not exist for 
the expenditure of funds required by the arbitrator. 
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The Illinois courts, however,  have held that State money can  be expended “by law” 
without legislative appropriations.  “[W]here a statute categorically commands the 
performance of an act, so much money as is necessary to pay the command may be 
disbursed without explicit appropriation.”[46] This means that State funds can be 
expended absent an explicit appropriation when required by statute or by the 
Constitution.[47]  In such circumstances the existence of a court order is sufficient 
legal authority for the State Comptroller to draw the warrants needed to pay a State 
obligation.[48] 
A second flaw in the State’s argument is that the arbitrator’s order in this case did 
not require the State to spend money that had not been appropriated.  At the time 
of the arbitrator’s decision, the State budget contained billions of dollars of 
personal services appropriations which could have been used to fund the pay 
increases in the contract.  The Governor made the decision to impose the pay freeze 
based upon the prediction that paying the wage increases in the collective 
bargaining agreement would cause specific agencies to run short of funds before 
the end of this fiscal year. 
But, that was going to happen anyway!  Wage increases or no wage increases, the 
appropriations enacted by the General Assembly were not sufficient to operate 
some of the largest State agencies.  Thus, both the Governor and the General 
Assembly knew in June 2011 that it would be necessary to enact supplemental 
appropriations to avoid closing State facilities and laying off thousands of State 
employees.  When the Circuit Court denied the Motion to Stay the enforcement of 
the layoff arbitration award, the Governor and the General Assembly cooperatively 
drafted and enacted legislation that appropriated sufficient funds to avoid 
violation of the award.  It is a fair inference that they did not do so with respect to 
the wage increases because the Motion to Stay had been granted and that a similar 
binding legal obligation did not exist. Had the Circuit Court denied the Motion to 
Stay in the pay freeze arbitration the General Assembly could have easily managed 
to scale back the tax breaks that it enacted with the supplemental appropriations 
in order to comply with a binding legal obligation. 
This review of history is appropriate because the Illinois Constitution requires the 
Governor and the General Assembly to share responsibility for enacting the State 
budget.  The Finance Article of the Illinois Constitution requires the Executive 
Branch and the General Assembly to share the responsibility for the annual 
budgetary process.  The Governor must propose the budget and  the proposed 
budget must fit the estimated revenues of the State.  The General Assembly is 
responsible for passing appropriations.  Those appropriations must not exceed 
revenues. The appropriations do not become law unless the Governor signs the 
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bills.  And, the Governor may reduce spending with the reduction veto, subject to 
a two-thirds override by the General Assembly. 
This division of roles in the budgetary process is consistent with the principle that 
the separation of powers doctrine contemplates a government of separate branches 
with shared and overlapping powers.[49] The separation of powers does not 
necessarily prohibit one branch of government from exercising powers which are 
ordinarily exercised by another.[50] The branches of government often have to 
work together to ensure that legal obligations are satisfied.[51] 
The courts in Illinois have taken a practical approach to the separation of powers 
in the budgetary process.  While some older court decisions treated the 
appropriations process as exclusively legislative,[52] more recently the courts have 
acknowledged the right of the executive to control the rate of spending of 
appropriated funds.[53] 
This practical approach to the issues that arise during the budgetary process is the 
one taken by both the Appellate Court in this case and the Supreme Court of 
Iowa.  It recognizes both the responsibility of the judiciary to say what the law is, 
and the responsibility of the more political branches of the government to work out 
solutions to budgetary issues within the constraints of the law.  Once the law is 
clear, the legislative and the executive branches have the opportunity to determine 
how to follow that law.  As the court in County of Cook v. Oglivie observed, 
responding to the claim that benefits had to be reduced if they were to last for the 
entire fiscal year, “that may be true, but the emergency does not exist now and 
remedial action may be forthcoming as it has been in the past.”[54] 
The Supreme Court of Iowa resolved a similar potential political logjam when the 
executive and legislative branches of that State confronted an interest arbitration 
decision awarding  raises to State employees.  Noting that the State “is liable on its 
contract,” the court observed that it “was entirely appropriate” for the governor to 
seek a judicial declaration regarding the legality of the award.  It concluded: 
The considerations, including political considerations that go into the appropriations process, are 
left to the legislative branch, with the executive participation we have mentioned.  The judicial 
branch will intercede, under its constitutional authority, in that process only when a failure to act, 
or a deadlock has left an adjudicated state obligation uncollectible.  We trust, owing to the goodwill 
and respect for the rule of law on the part of the governor and the legislators, such a point will not 
be reached in this dispute.[55] 
Such a practical approach would prevent the evisceration of the important 
statutory rights contained in the IPLRA.  By contract, a rule which makes the 
finality of contracts for State workers dependent on legislative appropriations 
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would have pernicious consequences for the collective bargaining 
process.  Executive branch officials would be tempted to make promises they could 
not keep, based upon the knowledge that the General Assembly might get the final 
“bite at the apple.”  Legislative leaders might be tempted to use the salaries and 
benefits of State workers as “bargaining chips” in the annual legislative 
process.  And, union negotiators would never engage in meaningful concessionary 
bargaining, as they did in this case, for fear of the membership fallout that might 
occur if the products of hard bargaining are then undone in the legislative 
process.  Such ill consequences will be magnified many times if the “out years” of 
a multi-year collective bargaining agreement are held to be unenforceable.  The 
General Assembly meant to avoid such evils when it wrote the IPLRA to give public 
employees and their unions the “full freedom” to form unions and to engage in 
collective bargaining. 
The Illinois courts have regularly acknowledged the very limited power of the 
judiciary to review arbitration awards.[56] The policy ensures that labor disputes 
are resolved quickly by agreed upon neutrals who are familiar with labor relations 
and that they are resolved peacefully without recourse to economic action or the 
disruption of important public services.[57] This policy in favor of the finality of 
labor arbitration awards has consistently been applied to limit judicial review of 
arbitration awards even when it its claimed that enforcement of the award would 
violate the “public policy” of the State.[58] Thus, the party seeking to vacate an 
award on “public policy” grounds must show that the policy in question is “well-
defined” and “dominant” by reference to laws and legal precedents, not from 
generalized considerations of “the public interest.”  Once the “public policy has 
been identified it must be shown that the award unmistakably violates that 
policy.[59] 
In the instant situation, acceptance of the State’s argument would severely 
compromise the statutory policy favoring collective bargaining by public 
employees and their unions.  As shown in this article, upholding the arbitrator’s 
award would not undermine either the public policy of the IPLRA or any well 
defined and dominant public policy regarding the power of the General Assembly 
The Illinois Supreme, therefore, would do well to uphold the Appellate court’s 
opinion in this case. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By, Student Editorial Board: 
Marko Cvijanovic, Christina Jacobson, Ian Jones, 
 and Karla Rodriguez 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes. 
I.  IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Arbitration 
In Chicago Teachers Union, Local No.1   and Chicago Board of Education, 31 
PERI ¶ 146 (IELRB 2015), the IELRB enforced an arbitration award despite the 
employer’s contention that the grievance was not arbitrable.  In 2012, the union 
filed a grievance asserting that the Chicago Board of Education violated the 
collective bargaining agreement when it redefined the counselor position at 
Clemente High School to require a masters degree in counseling and a high school 
teaching certificate with endorsement in Social Sciences or English. The purpose 
of the position change was to allow the counselors to teach a Senior Seminar in 
addition to their regular scheduled counseling duties, without additional 
compensation. 
The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration. An arbitrator found that the 
employer violated the contract.  The employer refused to comply with the award 
and the union filed an unfair labor practice charge. 
The employer relied on Article 10-6 of the contract which provided that principals 
were to assign duties to counselors that were consistent with the recommendations 
of the American School Counselor Association or other recognized organizations 
and that disagreements were to be resolved by the counselor, the principal and the 
Professional Problems Committee.  The employer argued that this provision 
withdrew jurisdiction from an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. 
Relying on its decision in Niles Township High School District No. 219, 29 PERI 
159 (IELRB 2013), the IELRB observed that where a question of arbitrability 
concerns interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the question is one 
for the arbitrator to decide.  The IELRB observed that, although the arbitrator did 
not expressly rule on arbitrability, she did consider the role that Article 10-6 gave 
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to the Professional Problems Committee.  Therefore, the IELRB concluded, the 
arbitrator impliedly found the grievance arbitrable. 
Furthermore, the  IELRB observed that the employer never challenged 
arbitrability before the arbitrator and emphasized that when a party fails to 
question arbitrability before the arbitrator it waives any arbitrability objections it 
might later seek to raise.  The IELRB thus held that the employer committed an 
unfair labor practice and ordered the employer to comply with the award. 
B.  Duty of Fair Representation 
In Brian J. McKenna and University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100, IFT-
AFT, 31 PERI ¶ 149 (IELRB 2015), the IELRB held that the union did not breach 
its duty of fair representation when it engaged in bargaining simultaneously on 
behalf of two different bargaining units with the same employer and traded off 
interests of employees in one unit for gains for employees in the other unit. 
The union represented two bargaining units at the Governors State University. 
Tenured and tenure-track faculty belonged to Unit A, while other faculty and 
academic support employees belonged to Unit B. The union negotiated 
simultaneously for both units. 
McKenna, a member of Unit A and a former member of the union’s bargaining 
team alleged that the union illegally traded off interests of Unit A to achieve 
benefits for Unit B.  Although a union must have discretion to balance competing 
interests of different employees within a bargaining unit, McKenna argued that it 
may not do so across two different bargaining units. 
The IELRB disagreed.  It observed that the IELRA expressly authorizes multi-unit 
bargaining.  It reasoned that a union must have the same discretion in balancing 
competing interests when it engages in multi-unit bargaining as when it bargains 
for a single unit.  The IELRB further found that McKenna did not carry his burden 
of proving intentional misconduct on the part of the union.  Therefore, the IELRB 
dismissed the duty of fair representation charge. 
II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Bargaining Units 
In International Union of Operating Engineers Local 965 v. ILRB, 2015 IL App 
(4th) 140352, the Fourth District Appellate Court affirmed the ILRB State Panel’s 
decision which granted the office of comptroller’s unit clarification petition and 
removed public service administrators (PSAs) from the bargaining unit. 
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On April 4, 2013, the union and the office of comptroller entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) involving comptrollers who held job classification 
title of PSA. On April 5, 2013, the general assembly amended section 3(n) of the 
act which defines “public employee,” to exclude any person who is a state employee 
under the jurisdiction of the office of the comptroller and who holds a PSA 
position. The office of the comptroller interpreted the language of the amendment 
to be self-effectuating, meaning that the PSAs employed by the comptroller no 
longer enjoyed collective bargaining rights. The union interpreted the amendment 
as not applying until the end of the existing CBA. After the office of the comptroller 
unilaterally removed PSA employees from the bargaining unit, the union filed a 
grievance alleging this action violated the CBA. 
The court considered whether the amendment to section 3(n) of the act was self-
effectuating. In reaching its decision that it was, the court noted that the general 
assembly did not clearly prescribe the temporal reach of the amendment and 
because of that the court had to determine whether the amendment was 
substantive or procedural. If the amendment was substantive it could not be given 
retroactive effect. The court held that the amendment to section 3(n) was a 
substantive amendment. However, the court reasoned that applying the 
amendment from the date it was passed (April 5, 2013) was not applying it 
retroactively.  The court further noted that the statue which created new 
requirements to be imposed in the present or the future and not in the past did not 
have a retroactive impact on the parties. 
B.  Duty of Fair Representation 
In Ziccarelli v. Illinois Labor Relation Board, 2015 IL App (1st) 141223-U, the First 
District Appellate Court affirmed the ILRB Local Panel’s decision dismissing 
Ziccarelli’s charge that the union failed to represent him fairly in an arbitration in 
2012. 
Between 2010 and 2012, Ziccarelli filed numerous grievances against his employer 
and was involved in a federal lawsuit against the employer in which he alleged 
violation of his civil rights on basis of race, gender, age and retaliation for filing 
grievances against the employer. While the federal suit was pending, Ziccarelli 
reached an agreement with his employer regarding some of the grievances. 
Ziccarelli was unhappy with how the employer followed through on their 
agreement and decided to go back to arbitration. The union agreed to postpone the 
arbitration until the federal suit against the employer was resolved. Ziccarelli 
contended that the union failed to properly represent his interests by agreeing to 
delay the resolution of his grievance until the federal lawsuit was settled. 
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The Board sent a notice to Ziccarelli’s attorney requiring him to submit 
information supporting his charge. Ziccarelli failed to comply with this request to 
provide the information to support the charge and the Local Panel dismissed the 
charge. In appealing this decision Ziccarelli’s attorney argued that he was unable 
to provide additional information because he was too busy handling other cases. 
The Local Panel denied Ziccarelli’s request for additional time, reasoning that he 
should have raised the claim immediately after he received the notice and not 
weeks after the time ran out. 
Ziccarelli then argued that the request for additional information in support of his 
charge was not a sufficiently formal request because it did not include a citation to 
a specific rule and because it did not provide a warning of consequences of non-
compliance. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that any argument or 
objection which is not raised during the pendency of the administrative proceeding 
is deemed waived and cannot be asserted during judicial review of the 
administrative agency’s decision. 
